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IN SUMMATION 
Planned constitution never got written, 
but Israel still got constitutional law 
By Marcia Gelpe 
I




pressures of the 
I III migration of tens of thousands of refu-
gees from other countries, repeated wars, 
IIIllI economic uncertainty, Israel has main-
tllined a stable democratic society since her 
t'stablishment as a modem state in 1948. 
She has done it without a written constitu-
tit)n - but not without the development of 
11 su bstantial body of constitutional law that 
is politically and legally important. 
Israel is a parliamentary democracy. At 
lilly given time, about eight active parties 
ohtain substantial shares of the vote, and 
(,;I(;h gets proportional representation in 
1 he parliament. 
Israel's legislative branch, the Knesset, 
h:ls 120 members. Most bills are enacted by 
Illajority vote, with no minimum quorum. 
As in Great Britain, statutes enacted by the 
p:lrliament are technically the highest law 
or the land. 
The executive branch is headed by the 
prime minister, who - until now - has 
hl'l'n chosen from among the members of 
the Knesset. Starting with the next elec-
t i( lIlS, the prime minister will be chosen by 
direct vote of the electorate. The prime 
III i n isteris always the head of one ofthe two 
1:lrgest parties, depending on which one is 
; I hlc to gamer a majority of Knesset votes 
hy forming a coalition with other parties. 
·I·hc prime minister forms the Government, 
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which includes heads of the ministries. The 
ministers have a more political role than the 
secretaries who head departments in the 
United States. The ministers participate in 
the Government, a creature of the parlia-
mentary system that has no precise paral-
lel in the U.S. system. 
The president is appointed by the 
Knesset for a five-year term. The presi-
dency is largely ceremonial, although the 
president may hold considerable influence 
over the conscience of the people - by per-
sonal stature as much as the office, 
Israel has a full system of trial and appel-
late courts. The highest court is the 
Supreme Court, which sits on all types of 
cases. Most important, sitting as the High 
Court of Justice, it reviews actions of ad-
ministrative authorities, to see that they are 
consistent with statutes and - more 
broadly -with the "rule of law," the con-
cept that the government is subject to 
structured principles in her actions. Ad-
ministrative authority is defined broadly 
and even includes committees of the 
Knesset. Justices of the Supreme Court 
are appointed by a committee on which sit-
ting judges and members of the bar hold 
the majority of seats, largely freeing the 
selection process from strong political 
influence. 
In democratic nations, constitutions gen-
erally fill two purposes: They set out the 
structure and powers of government, and 
they declare the individual rights that are 
to be protected from government interfer-
ence. In other words, they grant and limit 
government power. Constitutions are 
supra-legal documents. They are the high-
est law of the land, subject to change only 
by extraordinary means. 
Most of the main body of the U.S. 
Constitution, for example, is devoted to 
setting out the structure and powers of the 
federal government. The first ten amend-
ments are devoted mainly to setting out 
individual rights, in theform oflimitations 
on federal power. 
Although Israel lacks a written constitu-
tion, it has a body of law that defines the 
structure and powers of the government, 
declares individual rights, and is subject to 
change only by extraordinary means. 
The founders of the State of Israel 
planned to have a written constitution, but 
none was ever adopted. 
That was, and is, attributable in part to 
the continuous state of war. Within 24 
hours of its establishment in 1948, Israel 
was invaded by all her neighbors -
Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt - plus 
Iraq. There was no time for the newly 
forming government to debate and draft a 
constitution. Needing a legal regime, a law 
was enacted declaring that law existing at 
the time would remain the law of the land, 
to the extent it was not inconsistent with 
the Declaration of the Establishment of the 
State of Israel, and subject to change by 
later acts of the parliament. 
EGYPT AND, recently, Jordan have signed peace treaties with Israel, but otherwise 
the state of war and persistent internal 
threats to Israel's security have continued, 
making it difficult to develop a written con-
stitution. Democracies face extraordinary 
constitutional problems in times of war. 
Evidence of that is found in our own World 
War I-era cases on freedom of speech, 
which defined that freedom restrictively. 
To develop an entire constitution in such 
times is an even more daunting task. 
Compounding the challenge of writing 
a constitution is an unresolved debate on 
the religious nature of the Israeli state. Is-
rael was established to be the homeland for 
the Jewish people. Most Israelis agree that 
it is essential to maintain the Jewish nature 
of the state - but whether and to what ex-
tent the state should define and enforce 
Jewish religious norms is a subject of vig-
orous debate. The lack of agreement on this 
important matter hinders the enactment of 
a written constitution, which would be 
expected to address the issue. Much of 
this debate seems inscrutable to many in 
the West. Unlike most Western religions, 
Middle Eastern religions, including 
Judaism and Islam, intertwine religion 
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with what we in the United States call 
nationality and law. 
Finally, Israel's political structure has 
made constitutional enactment difficult. 
Because Israel's parliamentary system has 
many actively participating parties, and 
because minority parties playa crucial 
swing role in her coalition governments, it 
has been difficult to enact a constitutional 
document, which by its nature must reflect 
majority consensus more than minority 
demands. 
Despite those problems, the Israelis have 
felt the need for law of a constitutional 
nature. In 1950, the Knesset declared its 
intention to develop a constitution piece-
meal, by enacting a series of "Basic Laws." 
In addition, the Supreme Court has repeat-
edly recognized the need for preserving the 
rule of law and for protecting the rights of 
individuals from undue intrusion by the 
government. The public seems supportive 
of these attitudes. 
Without a written constitution, Israel 
has developed constitutional doctrine 
through two methods: enactment of Basic 
Laws by the Knesset and pronouncement 
of constitutional doctrine by the Supreme 
Court. 
The Knesset has enacted eleven Basic 
Laws. Six deal directly with the structure 
of the state (Knesset, President of the State, 
the Government, Armed Forces, Judiciary, 
and State Comptroller); two with indi-
vidual rights (Freedom of Occupation, and 
Human Dignity and Freedom), and three 
with other matters (Israel's Land, State 
Economy, and Jerusalem as Israel's Capi-
tal). Many of these laws, or their essential 
provisions, are" entrenched," which means 
they cannot be altered except by a major-
ity of the members of the Knesset. 
This is an extraordinary requirement, for 
two reasons. First, the Government usually 
constitutes only a slim majority of all 
Knesset members, so any vote that requires 
an absolute majority is really a vote of con-
fidence in the Government. Second, be-
cause no quorum is required for most 
Knesset action, most laws can be and are 
passed by a majority of the small fraction 
of the Knesset's members who actually vote 
on a particular matter. 
The idea that the Knesset can bind itself 
not to change future laws except through 
an extraordinary procedure is one diffi-
culty. In the United States, for example, a 
legislature can always change an earlier law 
by a later one. Moreover, the Israeli 
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Supreme Court has taken upon itself the 
task of declaring invalid later laws which 
contradict entrenched provisions in earlier 
Basic Laws. That, too, is odd in a system in 
which the parliament is conceived of as 
supreme and not subject to constitutional 
review in a court. 
The constitutional nature of the Basic 
Laws, at least their entrenched provisions, 
is evidenced by two features. First, at least 
eight of them deal with the usual topics of 
a constitution: the structure and powers of 
government and the protection of indi-
vidual rights. Second, they can be altered 
only by extraordinary means. This second 
feature is recognized by the Knesset and 
also by the Supreme Court, even though it 
presents some theoretical difficulties. 
OTHER constitutional doctrine, not anchored in the Basic Laws, is found 
in the case law developed by the Supreme 
Court. This law appears mainly in the con-
text of Supreme Court opinions interpret-
ing statutes and in cases determining the 
validity of administrative action. The court 
has been aggressive in interpreting legisla-
tion and administrative authority through 
rulings that establish principles of govern-
mental structure, on the one hand, and 
recognize individual freedoms, on the 
other. For example, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly exerted its power to consider the 
validity of administrative action asserted 
to be nonjusticiable based on its recogni-
tion of the importance of the doctrines of 
separation of powers and checks and bal-
ances, and its own role in preserving these 
doctrines. 
On the side of recognizing individual 
freedoms, the Supreme Court has been 
even more aggressive. It has recognized, at 
a minimum, the freedoms of speech, assem-
bly, religious practice, and occupation 
(even before this was recognized in a 
Basic Law); freedom from religious coer-
cion and from discrimination on the basis 
of nationality or gender; and the right not 
to be deprived of property without just 
compensation. 
When the court recognizes one of these 
freedoms, it interprets legislation or admin-
istrative authority in a ways consistent 
with those freedoms. In other words, it 
presumes that it was not the legislative in-
tent to enact a law or authorize administra-
tive action that would infringe on such a 
freedom. The presumption, almost 
irrebuttable, sometimes is used to justify an 
otherwise quite surprising interpretation of 
a statute. 
The court finds the constitutional prin-
ciples which it recognizes in a number of 
places: the Declaration of the Establish-
ment of the State of Israel, the democratic 
nature of the state, the general themes 
evidenced in her statutes, the concept of 
natural justice, and the concept of the rule 
of law. Some might say that the principles 
are also based on the ideas of the justices 
themselves. 
What justifies the court behaving in this 
way? One justification is the Foundations 
of Law Statute (1980), which says that if 
the court cannot resolve a case before it on 
the basis of statute, case law, or by analogy, 
it should resolve the case in "in light of the 
principles of freedom, justice, equity and 
peace ofIsrael's heritage." Another justifi-
cation is akin to that offered by Justice 
Marshall in Marbury v. Madison: In a de-
mocracy, some institution has to watch the 
government, and the court is the institution 
to do it. Others might argue that the best 
justification is the fact that the Israeli 
Supreme Court is the most respected insti-
tution of Israeli government - and main-
tains that respect by protecting important 
principles. Still others might claim that the 
only justification is the court's bald asser-
tion of power. 
In any case, this is how the court in fact 
works and establishes constitutional doc-
trine. The basic characteristics of constitu-
tional doctrine are present. The rulings deal 
with constitutional subject matter: the 
structure and power of government and 
the protection of individual rights. The rul-
ings can be changed only by extraordinary 
means. Although in theory these 
court-developed rules can be overturned at 
any time by the Knesset through ordinary 
legislation, in fact they cannot be so easily 
altered. The court's own aggressive protec-
tion of the such principles in its readings 
of statutes limits the Knesset's ability to al-
ter them by any but the most explicit means. 
Moreover, the prestige of the court func-
tionally dissuades the Knesset from over-
turning the principles without extra-
ordinary political debate and even 
upheaval. 
Israel's development of constitutional 
law without a written constitution presents 
a fascinating picture of how a system, 
unable to develop a constitution in the 
usual manner, has developed one in an-
other manner. It shows how innovative 
lawmaking'can be - and sometimes must 
be - to maintain a democratic political 
system. Ii] 
